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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY BY WILL
The purpose of this article is to analyze the concept of natural rights
in general and particularly to determine whether there is a natural
right to dispose of property by will; to set forth the Wisconsin law on
the right to dispose of property by will; and to evaluate two recent
Wisconsin statutes.
I. NATURAL RIGHTS
Although natural law and natural right are not interchangeable, they
do express different aspects of the same thing.' In terms of morality,
a right is an inviolable moral claim to some personal good. This claim
may be created by civil authority (legal right) or it may be derived from
man's rational nature (natural right). Essentially "rights" are means
enabling the possessor of them to obtain some end. It follows then, that
natural rights are means by which man attains the end appointed to
him by nature (rational life). Therefore, the extent, number and
existence of man's natural rights are determined by the exigencies of
rational living.
The natural rights of man are absolute in a certain sense,2 but it is
in the sense that their validity is not dependent on the will of anyone
except the individual in whom they reside and not in the sense that they
are subject to no limitations. To put it another way, abstractly, natural
rights are absolute when the individual is considered as an entity, but
in the concrete order, an individual's natural right is not absolute in
extension or exercise (although it is absolute in existence) because of
the common good. Consequently, although natural rights are correlative
with natural duties necessitated by the natural moral law 3-i.e., natural
rights are absolute in existence-yet there are limitations which come
1 J. Maritain, The Natural Law, Commonweal, May 15, 1942: 84- ". . . the
natural law and the light of moral conscience within is not only prescribe
certain things to do and not to do; they also recognize rights, and particularly
rights linked to the very nature of man. The human person has rights by the
very fact that it is a person, a whole, master of itself and of its acts, and
which is consequently not only a means, but an end, an end which must be
treated as such. The dignity of the human person-this phrase means nothing
if it does not mean that through the natural law the human person has the
right to be respected and is the subject of right, possesses rights."
2 Cf. I-II, q. 71, a.6 ad.4
I-If, q. 91, a.2
I-II, q. 94, a.4; a.5; a.6
I-II, q. 95, a.2; a.4
I-II, q. 96, a.2; ad.3
II-II, q. 57, a.2
3J. Maritain, note 1 supra: "There are certain things which are owed to
man by the very fact that he is man: The notion of right and the notion of
moral obligation are correlative: they rest upon the freedom proper to
spiritual agents. If a man is morally bound to do the things necessary for
the accomplishment of his destiny, it is because he has the right to accomplish
that destiny, and if he has the right to accomplish his destiny, he has the
right to do the things necessary therefor."
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from the ends of natural rights and from their reciprocal relations. To
deny the absoluteness of natural rights, as properly understood, would
be a violation of nature itself, in fact it would be a denial of the
possibility of a moral order. The logical corollary is to substitute a
mechanical or physical end and order.4
In the abstract, all men are equal with respect to their natural rights
since all are equal in the rational nature from which these rights are
derived; but in the concrete, they are unequal because the concrete
natures from which these rights spring are unequal-i.e., individual
men have varying capacities and this endowment of different powers
necessitates a variance in degree. Consequently, men are equal as re-
gards the sacredness, kind and number of their natural rights but in ex-
tension their rights are relative to their particular subjects. To put it
succinctly: natural rights inhere in all men without distinction as to
person but they do not necessarily have the same extension or content
in all men.
The origin of natural rights is found in the dignity of personality
which imposes upon the individual the duty of self-perfection; this is
the proximate source of the sacredness of natural rights and their
ultimate source is God who has decreed self-perfection as an end of
man. Consequently, the means (human rights) are sacred and inviolable.
Thus the basis of natural rights is man's duties, inasmuch as individual
perfection is the end and rule of conduct-i.e., the inherent sacredness
of man's personality or, to put it another way, derivation and determi-
nation by man's nature.5
Various formulae have been suggested to prescribe the limitations
4 An illustration of this is found in Huxley's comparison of life to a game of
chess in A LIBERAL EDUCATION included in SCIENCE AND EDUCATION 77 (1907) :
"The chess board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe,
the rules of the game are what we call the laws of nature. The player on the
other side is hidden from us. We know that his play is always fair, just and
patient. But also we know, to our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake or
makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. To the man who plays well, the
highest stakes are paid, with that sort of over-flowing generosity with which
the strong show delight in strength. And one who plays ill is checkmated-
without haste, but without remorse."
5 In opposition to this is the basic theory (although there are many variations
of it) that all rights are derived from society and are contingent upon social
welfare insofar as society gives them social organization. See D. C. RrrcHrE,
NATURAL RiGHTS. For one of the philosophic sources of this theory, see
HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DU PHILosoPHIc DES RE1CHTS: very superficially, its
philosophic basis is that the State is a good in itself because it is a highest
manifestation of Universal Reason (the only final reality) and consequently
the good of the social organism is the end and rule of conduct-therefore, all
rights are derived and intended for the glory of the State. Also see:
III BENTHAM, WORKS 219: "Natural rights is simple nonsense. Natural and
imprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon stilts"; John
Dewey, Nature and the Supernatural, 4 included in Yervant Krikovian, ed.,
NATURALISM AND THE HUMAN SPIRT (1944) : "The idea that unless standards
and rules are absolute, and hence eternal and immutable, they are not rules
and criteria at all is childish."
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on the exercise of human rights,6 but a very satisfactory formula is
that a person has the right to those things which are necessary or
essential for the development of his personality in a reasonable manner
insofar as they are consonant with the rights of others and the moral
law.
II. RIGHT TO MAKE A WILL
The right to dispose of property after death obviously stems from
and depends upon the nature of rights in property and requires some
investigation of the nature of property rights. From man's position
in the order of the universe, it follows that he has a natural right to
use those material things which are necessary for the attainment of his
end: that is to say, man has a natural dominion over those material
things which are necessary to satisfy the reasonable needs of his nature
(but this natural dominion is only in reference to the power to use
material things) .7 Consequently, man has a natural right to the
possession of material things, but there is no natural right as to the
forms of possession or ownership. Thus, on a logical basis, the possible
forms of possession and use of property are: common possession and
use by all persons, common possession and use by the community and
individual possession and use by individuals. However, the form of
possession which is best for man, although not a natural right, is private
property," because:
1. Metaphysically, one of the "properties" of man, as a spiritual
agent, is the free and rational disposition of external goods.
2. Psychologically, external possessions are the foundation for
the development of man's personality and consequently the
age in the form of "mine" has an intimate relationship with
the "it."
3. Socio-ethically, a man will care more for what belongs to him
and hence greater order and peace will exist in society.9
III. WISCONSIN DOCTRINE OF RIGHT TO MAKE A WILL
The Wisconsin doctrine of a right to make a will is not only com-
mensurate with the power of disposal by contract or gift,10 but is more
sacred"' and one of the highest equities which courts can consider. 12
This right is a natural right in the form of a constitutional guarantee
6For example: a man has the right to do anything that is consonant with the
liberty of others. See I. KANT, METAPHYSILS DER SITTEN Sec. C, or J. FICHTO,
SCIENCE OF RIGHTS 161.
7 SUMMA THEOL, II-II, q. 66.
8 34 MARQ. L. Rxv. 151.
9 SUMMA THEOL., II-II, q. 66, a.2, c.
10 Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N.W. 92, 50 N.W. 1103 (1879).
"Will of Rice: Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956 (1912)
Will of Duncan: Duncan v. Metcalf, 154 Wis. 39, 141 N.W. 1002 (1913);
Estate of. Williams: Whaley v. Avery, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N.W. 652 (1927);
Will of Szperka: Okzewski v. Borek, 254 Wis. 153, 35 N.W2d 209 (1948).
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under the "pursuit of happiness" section of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion.13 This right also includes the concomitant right to have the will
carried out.' 4 It is one which neither courts, parties nor legislature can
invade nor destroy and can only be taken away by constitutional
change ;15 but it is subject to reasonable regulation' 6-- e.g., the state may,
under proper circumstances, determine the manner of execution of wills,
levy inheritance taxes, and limit within reason the extent of testator's
beneficiaries.
Fundamentally in the United States there is a basic split as to the
validity of compromises which provide for a distribution in a manner
other than that provided by will'--whether a contested or uncontested
will. The majority rationale for recognizing the validity of such agree-
ments is that since the property belongs to the beneficiaries and would
be subject to any transfer that they would deem fit after the distribution,
then a realistic view should recognize that they be allowed to divide it
by agreement before they received it-such an agreement of division is
in no sense a new will because it is based on the assumption that the
property will be distributed as directed by the will; hence, it is a contract
disposing of what one rightfully has. On the other hand, Wisconsin
refuses to recognize the validity of such a compromise on the basis
that the right to make a will and have it carried out is a natural right
in the form of a constitutional guarantee under the "pursuit of happi-
ness" section, although there have been indications by the Wisconsin
court that the real basis is public policy.'8
IV. EFFECT OF RECENT WISCONSIN STATUTES
In view of the long established and clearly ennunciated Wisconsin
doctrine, an interesting problem arises as to the constitutionality of
Sections 45.37(3) (Chapter 399, Laws of 1949) and 318.31 (Chapter
367, Laws of 1951).
The only known determination under Section 45.37(3) is the case
of In re Estate of Fred Luck decided by the County Court of Waupaca
12Vance v. Davis, 118 Wis. 548, 95 N.W. 939 (1903).
1i Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906); Will of Rice,
op.cit.; In re Estate of Ogg, 262 Wis. 181, 54 N.W.2d 175 (1952); Cf. Wis.
CONST. ART. I, §1; Axr. XIV, §13.
" Will of Dardis, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332 (1908); Will of Rice, op.cit.;
Boardman v. Lorentzen, 155 Wis. 566, 145 N.W. 750 (1914); Will of
Schaefer: Schaefer v. Ziebell, 207 Wis. 404, 241 N.W. 382 (1932); In re
Estate of Svendso, 257 Wis. 335, 43 N.W.2d 343 (1950).
15 Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N.W. 5 (1913); Nunrkemacher v.
State, op.cit.; Will of Boardman: Chase v. Amadon, 178 Wis. 517, 190 N.W.
355 (1922).
16Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 544, 121 N.W. 347 (1909)-overruled on different
point by 184 Wis. 88, 197 N.W. 344 (1924); Will of Ball: Ball v. Boston,
153 Wis. 27, 141 N.W. 8 (1913); Will of Griffith: Enright v. Griffith,
165 Wis. 601, 163 N.W. 138 (1917).
1797 A.L.R. 468 (1935).
28 205 Wis. 597, 238 N.W. 377 (1931).
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County. The facts of the case were: testator died on December 12,
1949, unmarried, with no relatives in this country, and as a resident of
the Grand Army Home for Veterans at King, Wisconsin. Under the
provisions of his will, he devised all of his estate, with the exception of
a reservation of one hundred dollars for Masses for the repose of his
soul, equally to his two brothers and sisters or their heirs, all of whom
resided in Germany. On the same day of the execution of his will
(January 24, 1940) testator made a written application for admission
to the Grand Army Home for Veterans at King. At the time of his
admission to the Home as a member, section 45.37(2) (j) of the
Wisconsin Statutes was in force and effect, which section provided:
"All members who enter the home shall sign an agreement as
follows: 'I, in consideration of having received domiciliary care,
agree that in event of my death, leaving no heirs at law or next
of kin, all personal property owned by me at the time of my
death, including money or choses in action held by me and not
disposed of by Will, whether such property be the proceeds of
pension, compensation, or life insurance; or otherwise derived,
shall vest in and become the property of the state of Wisconsin
for the sole use and benefit of the Grand Army Home for
Veterans, subject to be reclaimed by any legatee or person
entitled to take the same by inheritance at any time within one
year after my death.' "
In 1949, the Wisconsin State legislature by virtue of Chapter 399, Laws
of 1949, repealed section 45.37(2) (j) and enacted section 45.37(3)
which provided:
"If any member of the home shall die without legal dependents,
his real property shall descend and his personal property shall
be distributed to the state of Wisconsin as sole heir for the sole
use and benefit of the home, and no Will, previously or hereafter
drawn, making a contrary disposal shall be valid. A wife or
mother residing at the home shall be included among and con-
sidered as a legal dependent for the purpose of this subsection."
On the question whether section 45.37(3) was unconstitutional as
offiending against Art. I, Section I of the Wisconsin Constitution, in
that it deprived a resident of the right to make a testamentary disposition
of his property of which he dies possessed, the court 'held: that in
determining the relationship existing between a member of the Home
and the people of the State of Wisconsin, a brief review of the history
of the Home indicated an intent by the GAR and the state legislature
"to provide a Home for those disabled or diseased veterans who were
not possessed of sufficient means to support themselves and who, in the
absence of this provision by the State would be without the necessities
and comforts of life."'" Hence there was no "contractual relationship
19 In re Estate of Fred Luck, County Court, Waupaca County, Order Deter-
mining Issues and for Judgment, 8.
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between the State as the grantor of a bounty and the member of the
Home who is a recipient of such bounty. Certainly the support in the
Home is a gift upon the part of the State. This being true, it follows
that the State may make the enjoyment of its benefaction dependent
upon any reasonable conditions. ' 20 Therefore, 45.37(3) is constitutional
because it "did not deprive the deceased of his right to make a Will, it
merely limited his beneficiaries to his legal dependents." It is also well
settled that constitutional rights as well as any other personal or property
right may be waived. Osborn v. State, 143 W. 249; Finsky v. State,
176 W. 481. If the State of Wisconsin by legislative enactment
"had in fact provided that a member of the Home would have
no right to make a Will disposing of his property, the acceptance
by the member of the benefits of the Home, would effectively
waive the constitutional right involved. The Courts have fre-
quently said that, 'One may not enjoy the benefits and privileges
of a statute and after so doing escape its burden by attacking its
validity-the individual need not accept the benefits, but if he
does so he subjects himself to whatever condition the legislature
may see fit to impose.' Fresbe v. U.S. 157 U.S. 160.21
Thus the court sustained the constitutionality of 45.37(3) on the
theories of "gift" and "waiver of rights." The principles and decision
in this case do not seem to offend the constitutional guarantee of private
property which is considered as a natural right, inasmuch as a consti-
tutional right is subject both to reasonable regulation and waiver. Nor
does the decision contravene any philosophical conception of rights to
private property, inasmuch as man's form of possession is contingent
on its reasonable determination by the society in which he lives: thus,
in our society, the form of possession, by virtue of historical develop-
ment based on a perspicuity through experience, is private property,
whose only limitations are the dictate of reason in view of a constitu-
tional mandate.
There are no known determinations under section 318.31. An
analysis of 318.31 reveals that it provides for, a compromise (which
may be approved by the court and must be approved by the court before
binding) in two basic situations:
1. The first situation is where there are controversies between
different claimants in an estate where either the deceased died
testate or intestate (since the court may authorize executors,
administrators, or trustees). All those claiming parties whose
interest are affected by the compromise must join with the
executor, administrator or trustee in the compromise. If one
of these necessary parties is subject to guardianship, then the
court must appoint a guardian who shall execute all the
20 Ibid., 9.
21 Ibid., 10.
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proper instruments necessary for the compromise. In addi-
tion, the court must appoint persons to represent persons
unknown or future contingent interests of persons not in
being if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that their
interests may be affected by the compromise (under these
circumstances, any money or property set aside, may be de-
posited, in a proper case, with a trust company, a state or
national bank authorized to exercise trust powers, or a public
administrator, subject to orders of the court). In order for
the compromise to be valid and binding, it must be found by
the court to be just and reasonable in its effects upon the
interests of all the necessary parties to the compromise-i.e.,
any person whose interest is affected regardless of whether
he is a person subject to guardianship, an unknown person,
a person not in being, or an adult person of sound mind.
2. The second situation is where there are controversies between
devisees and legatees and persons claiming under the statute
of descent and distribution (hence only where the deceased
died testate). All of these persons whose interests are
affected by the compromise and the executor (except where
the executor named in the will renounces) must be parties
to the compromise. The same rules in this situation apply as
in the first situation as to persons subject to guardianship,
unknown persons, and persons not in being, and further the
same criteria is applicable-i.e., just and reasonable in its
effects.
The procedure for the approval of the compromise is the same in both
situations:
(a) The compromise must be in writing.
(b) The application for approval must be by a verified petition.
(c) The petition must set forth
1. Provisions of the instrument or document;
2. All facts relating to claims;
3. Possible contingent interests of persons not in being;
4. All facts which make it proper or necessary that the
proposed compromise be approved.
(d) The application may be made prior to execution of proposed
compromise.
(e) The court will make inquiry into all circumstances which
justice requires.
Arguments pro and con may be reasonably advanced to support the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the statute. Thus, in a recent,
ably-written article22 appearing in the Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, the
writer, although conceding that other states have compromise statutes, 23
2225 Wis. BAR BuLL. No. 2, 18, April, 1952. Hon. Allen Simpson.
23E.g., In re Sidman's Estate, 154 Misc. Reps. 675, 278 N.Y.S. 43 (1935);
In re White's Estate, 182 Misc. Reps. 223, 46 N.Y.S 2d 917 (1943); Ellis
v. Hunt, 228 Mass. 39 (1917); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575,
2 N.W.2d 509 (1942); In re Peck's Estate, 323 Mich. 11, 34 N.W.2d 533(1948).
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and that there are situations in Wisconsin where the wishes of the
testator are not carried out,24 and, in addition, indications by the Wis-
consin court that the right is not a constitutional right,25 yet 318.31
should be declared unconstitutional because:
1. It will leave the law of wills unsettled and create trouble-
some litigation.
2. There is no criteria to determine what compromises should
be approved and hence there will be a great variance in those
approved by courts.
3. The compromise factor affords great opportunities for "black
sheep" to utilize blackmail and duress.
4. A compromise may always be effected after the estate has
been distributed.
5. The doctrine of natural right to make a will has long been
entrenched in Wisconsin jurisprudence and only affects Wis-
consin citizens so that compromise statutes in other juris-
dictions have no bearing: further, since it is a constitutional
right, it can only be taken away by constitutional change.
6. The few remaining natural rights retained by the citizenry
should not be readily sacrificed.
On the other hand, strong arguments are advanced, largely on the
ground of practical and efficient probate practice, to support such pro-
visions. It should be emphasized again that in those jurisdictions which
accept these arguments, a problem does not arise which does in Wis-
consin, namely, the interpretation that such a right is a natural right in
the form of a constitutional guarantee. 26 Thus, in the early Massachu-
setts case of Clarke v. Cordis,27 the court said the compromise must be
just, reasonable, judicious and expedient 28 and prescribed certain cir-
cumstances making a controversy a subject of compromise to be:
1. Must properly be the subject of adjustment and compromise.
2. Involves difficult and doubtful questions both of fact and law.
3. Its determination by a regular course of legal proceedings
would be attended with great uncertainty as to its final result.
4. From various causes it might be difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish thereby perfect justice to all the parties interested.
24Illustrations: An executor may decline to act: 310.16; Beneficiaries may
decline to take under Will: 319.03; Widows election: 233.13; Immediate
vesting in remamdermen where refusal by beneficiary to take under trust-
259 W. 361.
25205 Wis. 597, 238 N.W. 377 (1931).26Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Merchants National Bank of Boston,
318 Mass. 563, 62 N.E.2d 831 (1945); "Distribution of property by will or
descent is not a natural right but a privilege conferred by the state, which
may impose any conditions not in conflict with Federal or State constitution";
Irving Trust Company v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942): "The Federal Constitu-
tion nowhere forbids Legislative of state to Limit, condition or even abolish
power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction."
-'4 Allen 466 (1862).
28 Cf. WIs. STATS. (1951), sec. 318.31(5) : "--if found by the court to be just
and reasonable in its effects."
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Thus, restrictive areas are staked as to what may be compromised and
the criteria in those areas is "just and expedient." In a subsequent
Massachusetts case, 29 the court said that an approved agreement of
compromise is not a modification of the will but rather a modification
of the rights of the parties under the will. The will stands by itself
and the changes wrought in the disposition of the property are not the
result of changes in the will, but of concessions by the parties. Thus,
it is not a situation where the parties make a new will for a testator,
but rather a facilitating of the "making of valid contracts by competent
legatees and devisees as to what they will do with that which they may
receive under a will, subject to the supervisory power of the court to
see that such contracts are just and reasonable toward all interests
whether in being or future contingent." 30 Further arguments advanced
are that the testator should not have unlimited freedom of testamentary
disposition of property so as to pauperize his dependents 3' and public
policy as to conserving and insuring harmony among the living members
of a family is stronger than any policy preserving the wishes of the
dead.
32
It can be seen that most of the arguments on both sides hinge around
the nature of a public policy as to the essence of a testamentary power.
Since the public policy on this power in Wisconsin has been interpreted
in the form of a constitutional guarantee, most of the arguments on both
sides do not seem in point as to the constitutionality of 318.31. The
constitutionality of the statute is contingent on the precise nature of the
constitutional guarantee. The constitutional guarantee is "the establish-
ment of every valid will"3 3 and its being carried into effect. Hence the
constitutional guarantee will be fulfilled once the validity of the will is
established, admitted into probate and the property distributed according
to the terms of the will. Consequently, since the rights of any parties
to a compromise under 318.31 are contractual, it will not displace the
will or the testamentary rights of any beneficaries, but rather, as the
court said in In re Ellis:3 4 The will as an entirety and in all its parts is
established and admitted to probate. The court does not undertake to
admit to probate a part of the will and to refuse to allow another part
-The agreement is not incorporated into the will. The will stands by
itself-The changes wrought in the disposition of the property are not
the result of changes in the will, but of concessions by the beneficiaries
under the will to the heirs at law or among themselves as to the dis-
position to be made of the interest granted by the will. It is a chang
29 In re Ellis, 228 Mass. 39, 116 N.E. 956 (1917).
30 Ibid.
s1 Cf. 13 CORNELL L. REV. 559 (1928) ; 19 GREEN BAY 607, 613.
32 128 Miss. 699, 91 So. 394 (1922).
33 Rice's Will, op.cit. 446.
34 In re Ellis, op.cit. 956.
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made, not in the expression of the will but in the violation of legatee or
devisee as to what he is to do with the benefaction which he has re-
ceived under the will." Therefore, 318.31 should be declared consti-
tutional, because it does not impinge or conflict with the wholesome
doctrine of natural right to make a will.
A very practical problem arising under 318.31 is who may test the
constitutionality of the statute.35 Thus, assuming that the probate judge
would deny the verified petition for approval of the compromise, who
could appeal? Since all of the necessary parties (those whose interests
are affected by the compromise) must join the compromise; there would
be no adversary on appeal. In addition, assuming that an appeal were
allowed, the appellants would be in no position to deny the constitution-
ality of the statute, nor would they want to, but rather, their argument
would be based on an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, assuming
that the probate judge approved the compromise, who could appeal?
Certainly none of the necessary parties to the compromise would want
to appeal and they are the only parties involved in the litigation. Two
situations suggest themselves as to how the constitutional question may
be raised: in the first situation, one of the beneficiaries who was a
necessary party to the compromise could regret and try to escape the
burdens of the agreement by arguing on appeal that the statute (318.31)
authorizing the compromise was unconstitutional. But in such a
situation, the court could apply the principle that he who accepts the
benefits of a statute cannot escape its burdens by subsequently attacking
its constitutionality: and such a beneficiary would have received a
benefit in the form of a quid pro quo such as forbearance of suit. In
the second type of situation, there is a possibility that the Attorney
General could intervene because "the proceedings to probate a Will is a
proceeding in rem, binding all the world, and in which even public
welfare and policy is involved" 36 and hence represent the public as "the
whole body of the people being parties."37 But who would give the
Attorney General notice and where is the authorization for such notice
or intervention?
Further problems, outside the scope of this article, which will arise
3525 Wis. BAR BULL. No. 2, 35: "It would seem that the most likely manner
in which it might come before the Supreme Court would be where the heirs
and beneficiaries under a will would introduce a stipulation as provided for
in Chap. 367; that they would present the matter to a county judge who
would refuse to accept the compromise and who would merely enter findings
which were prepared by stipulating parties .... If an appeal is made under
a state of facts as above, both sets of attorneys are interested in the
stipulation, and while it becomes probably the duty for the attorney for
the executor to uphold the will, it must be remembered that he was chosen
almost invariably by those who want the stipulation to be accepted:'
J6 Will of Dardis, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332.
37 Will of Rice, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N.W. 956.
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under 318.31 are the effect of will contest compromises on inheritance
taxes 8 and the effect of any extinguishment of contingent interests.A9
V. SUMMARY
On a philosophical level, there is no natural right as to the form of
possession; but on a legal level, in Wisconsin, there is a natural right to
dispose of private property by judicial interpretation in the form of a
constitutional guarantee. It is suggested that the two recent Wisconsin
statutes should be declared constitutional, inasmuch as they do not
impinge upon this constitutional guarantee.
ARTHUR SCHELLER, JR.
38 139 A.L.R. 1524.
39 69 A.L.R. 924.
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